On Nietzschian Methodology

 

“Now in the first place it is obvious to me that the actual genesis of the concept “‘good’” is sought and fixed in the wrong place by this theory: the judgment “good” does not stem from those to whom “‘goodness”’ is rendered! Rather it was “’the good’” themselves, that is the noble, powerful, higher-ranking, and high-minded who felt and ranked themselves and their doings as good, which is to say, as of the first rank, in contrast to everything base, low-minded, common, and vulgar.”
– Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality.

Recently, I discussed the insensitivity to detail displayed by Karl Marx in that he hyperbolizes several statements throughout his dissertation Estranged Labor. The reason for my critique of Marx’s diction was that in a philosophical work, any outliers to a proof exclude perfection and absolutism; more specifically, that Marx presents his ideas hyperbolically and thus hinders his own attempts to persuade. This error in methodology forces me to take everything Marx claims with a hint of salt from a philosophical viewpoint (not to mention the formal nature of Marx’s writing intertwined with the aforementioned methodological error makes the entire reading experience a bit less enjoyable). In Nietzsche’s case, he makes this same blunder along with other philosophical “don’ts”: he speaks in absolutes, he trusts his own opinions, and from his own opinions and experience formulates his statements. The quotation I have chosen illustrates these three rule-defying tactics. He speaks absolutely about other’s short-comings to the point of calling them “obvious[ly … wrong]” without delving into the root of their errors; he proceeds to give an alternate view presented as the absolute correct statement;   essentially, Nietzsche says he’s right without ever proving the other side wrong. The reasoning behind my finding Nietzsche’s methodology so fascinating is that it does not bother me. Particularly, I do not see the same argument I made in the case of Marx—that his methodology and diction results in the hindrance of his arguments—as applicable to Nietzsche’s writing.

            Nietzsche possesses a certain pride that is unnoticeable in other philosophical works. I picture Nietzsche reading a long, arduous proof (i.e., Descartes’ proofs of God’s existence) and thinking “get to the point already, man.” In this I have grouped Descartes with other philosophers, not other philosophies. These philosophers seem to have a code—a rulebook of sorts—that dictates how a persuasive essay (or dialogue—the medium is irrelevant) is articulated: every seemingly small step is in actuality not so at all, perceptions of reality are not viewed as convincing, et cetera. Nietzsche, though, disregards these guidelines almost entirely and by doing so allows for much more free thought and for more elaborate, absolute conclusions to be reached with incredible brevity. This may not be how other people read Nietzsche, but I cannot help but wonder how and why other philosophers take such a rebellious figure seriously.

            The way I see it, Nietzsche’s persuasiveness stems directly from his methodology—his passionate convictions and excited grammar perfectly parallel his hybrid postmodern/stream-of-consciousness/informal writing style. The uncertainty of most other philosophers causes uncertainty in his or her audience, but this indecision is all but absent in Nietzsche’s writing. He speaks absolutely and with an air of hubris; he believes whole-heartedly he is correct and will present his ideas as such. He does not buck from this method and this consistency augments his arguments as he neither attempts to emulate past thinkers nor their respective methodologies; rather, this is an entirely different approach to philosophy. Thus, it is possible to question whether or not Nietzsche is a philosopher at all or merely, as Descartes would say, a “thinking thing.” Is he trying to persuade an audience or just telling said audience how he thinks it is? —His informality and method point toward the latter, which I lean towards as well. A person with many thoughts and opinions does not necessarily constitute a philosopher. What it does represent though is man’s innate will to think, feel, express and analyze. To me, Nietzsche is purely that—a man with thoughts to express and a medium to express them.